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I. INTRODUCTION

It is well established that scientific research misconduct often goes
unreported.' Consequently, such conduct may be more prevalent than
otherwise expected in a professional community that counts on-and
prides itself on-self-regulation. In the last few decades, concerns about
scientific research integrity have gravitated to center stage, 2 stimulating
the introduction and revisions of federal regulations and institution
rules. Perhaps most important to biomedical research are U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations, in effect
since 2005 (42 C.F.R. Part 90). These federal regulations dictate activity
by HHS, agencies of the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS), including
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), as well as thousands of
* Ph.D., J.D. Partner with Foley & Lardner LLP, and a member of the firm's Chemical,
Biotechnology & Pharmaceutical, Intellectual Property Litigation and Appellate Practices.
Thanks to George Best, Ph.D., J.D., for his helpful comments.
1. Sandra L. Titus et al., Repairing Research Integrity, 453 NATURE, 980-82 (2008)
(indicating that not all potential misconduct are reported to universities and few are reported to
ORI).
2. In 1985, Congress enacted the Health Research Extension Act, requiring that PHSfunded institutions establish a process for evaluating reports of scientific fraud. In March 1989,
the PHS created the Office of Scientific Integrity (OSI) at NIH, and an Office of Scientific
Integrity Review (OSIR) within HHS. In June 1992, these offices were merged to create the
Office of Research Integrity (ORI), an entity not part of NIH. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Services, Fact Sheet: Promoting Integrity in Research (Jan. 13, 2010),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/factsheet/integrity.html [hereinafter Promoting Integrity in Research].
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institutions receiving research funds from PHS agencies. HHS
regulations serve as models for regulations and resulting institutional
rules/policies affecting all science communities on the issue of research
misconduct.
In an apparent effort to motivate people to report suspected research
misconduct, regulations and institutional rules have provided
increasingly broad protections for "whistleblowers" (complainants).
Such regulations and rules prohibit, for example, retaliation against
whistleblowers. Even today, the federal government's Office of
Research Integrity (ORI) and other groups continue to advocate for
even greater protections for whistleblowers, as well as "zero tolerance"
both for those who commit misconduct and for those who fail to report
suspected misconduct.3 Regulations and rules also protect research
institutions themselves against retaliation and lawsuits "to conserve
public funds." 4
These regulations and rules appear to be motivated by a belief that if
costs to the whistleblower and the institution are kept low, good faith
researchers will report research misconduct whenever possible. Despite
significant protections for whistleblowers and institutions, however,
many scientists remain reluctant to come forward. Even the repeated
broadening of these protections has not provided the necessary
motivation.
In contrast to whistleblowers, protections for those accused of
misconduct have not garnered much attention. In fact, legal protections
for accused scientists are few and far between, and often entirely
ineffective. Furthermore, little to no recourse exists when protections
for the accused fail to provide anything remotely resembling due
process.
Despite a lack of public attention on the issue, the dearth of proper
protections for those accused is likely to be a significant part of why
those people having legitimate concerns do not volunteer information.
Without viable protections in place for accused researchers, wellmeaning scientists will be reluctant to come forward. Most scientists
understand the significant harm associated with even a mere allegation
of misconduct, not to mention the cost of an official proceeding,
regardless of any proof or outcome. Confidentiality failures, for
example, cause immediate damage, while at the same time a lack of
procedural protections makes it difficult for researchers to defend
themselves against an institution acting as an investigator, judge and
jury. Scientists generally have no interest in harming a fellow
3. See, e.g., Titus et al., supra note 1, at 980, 982.
4. 42 C.F.R. § 93.107 (2011) (stating that the regulations must be interpreted, inter alia,
"to conserve public funds").
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researcher's reputation and career (not to mention causing harm to other
affiliated people) unless they have either definitive proof of the most
egregious misconduct, or a malicious motive in coming forward.
If scientific communities wish to promote scrutiny of research
misconduct, and thereby root out and reduce such conduct, federal
regulations and institutional rules must enact and enforce adequate and
equitable protections for all scientists, not just political favorites. In
other words, such scientists necessarily include those accused of
misconduct-even the guilty-not just whistleblowers and others
involved in the process. Such protections must be in place well before a
formal allegation is lodged. In addition, after official proceedings begin,
protections must remain in place continuously throughout the process,
and extend through a viable and objective appeals process. Such
protections will motivate researchers to come forward with information
regarding suspicious activity. A need for reform exists to achieve the
dual goals of maintaining zero tolerance of misconduct and
appropriately protecting all scientists. Proposed changes to federal
regulations, such as those described below, will go far to help achieve
these goals.
II. RESEARCHERS ACCUSED OF MISCONDUCT CURRENTLY LACK
MANY IMPORTANT PROTECTIONS

Federal regulations outline responsibilities and protections for those
involved in scientific research misconduct allegations and proceedings.
HHS regulations describe, for example, official proceedings involving:
(1) an initial assessment to determine whether an allegation meets the
definition of research misconduct;5 (2) an institutional inquiry to
determine whether to conduct an investigation; 6 and (3) an institutional
investigation.7 Individuals involved in the proceedings usually include
the accused (respondents), complainants, witnesses, inquiry and
investigation committee members, as well as other scientists,
administrators and legal members of the institution needed to implement
the process. Notably, regulations today fail to provide the accused with
the same level of protections given to everyone else in the process.
For instance, 42 C.F.R. § 93.300 (2011) describes overall protections
that institutions must put in place, describing the "[g]eneral
responsibilities for compliance" of the regulations as a whole. While
certain portions of this section refer to protections such as prompt
5. 42 C.F.R. § 93.307(a) (2011) ("institutional inquiry").
6. Id. § 93.307(c).
7. Id. § 93.310 ("institutional investigation").
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action, confidentiality and fairness in proceedings, 8 subsection (d)
addresses the protection of "positions and reputations" of scientists
involved in the process.9 Specifically, subsection (d) states that
institutions must "[take all reasonable and practical steps to protect the
positions and reputations of good faith complainants, witnesses and
committee members and protect them from retaliation by respondents
and other institutional members."10 As intended by the drafters, this
subsection fails to mention respondents (the accused), but instead only
protects others from retaliation by respondents."
As stated in the relevant final rules:
The purpose of the retaliation provision is to encourage
researchers to come forward with good faith allegations of
research misconduct and to encourage good faith cooperation
with a research misconduct proceeding. In ORI's experience,
there has been no showing of a need to protect respondentsfrom
retaliation in order to ensure they will take steps to defend
against an allegation of misconduct. In contrast, experience has
shown a need to restore the reputations of respondents where
there is a finding of no misconduct and Sec. 93.304(k) requires
institutions to do that. If a need to protect respondents from
retaliation is shown, institutions have broad discretion under the
rule to address that situation on a case-by-case basis or adopt a
policy to remedy the problem.12
In other words, regulations appear to assume that such protections
are entirely unnecessary for an accused scientist unless and until there is
an affirmative finding of no misconduct, i.e., only after all relevant
proceedings, in their entirety are finished. The stated reason is that
accused scientists "will take steps to defend against an allegation of
misconduct."' 3
While accused scientists will certainly take steps to defend
themselves, they nearly always suffer immediate and long-term
consequences created by the mere existence of an accusation. These
adverse effects often last for the entire length of misconduct
proceedings, which can take years to complete. In addition, adverse
8. Id. § 93.300(b), (c), (e).
9. Id. § 93.300(d).
10. Id.
11. Id.; see also id. § 93.304(1) (2011) (citing similar protections, but failing to provide
protections for respondents); id. § 93.226 (2011) (defining "Retaliation" without mentioning
respondents).
12. Public Health Service Policies on Research Misconduct, 70 Fed. Reg. 28370, 2837778 (May 17, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 50, 93) (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 28378.
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effects often endure after proceedings conclude, even when no
misconduct is found.14 One-sided protections, therefore, do not
encourage good faith researchers to come forward and cooperate in
misconduct proceedings. The inherent lack of fairness and proper
protection for the accused creates a belief that misconduct allegations
and procedures-baseless or not-impose a draconian penalty upon the
accused. This belief "chills" the very researchers whom the regulations
intend to encourage to come forward.
Although the Federal Register states that "institutions have broad
discretion under the rule to address that situation on a case-by-case basis
or adopt a policy to [protect the accused from retaliation]," 5 most
institutions choose not to provide additional protections for accused
scientists in this regard, or in fact, in any other regard, outside those
mandated by federal regulations and/or already existing institutional
rules. At minimum, the significant effort involved in drafting such
"discretionary" rules create an incentive for institutions to take the
passive route, that is, do nothing to protect accused scientists beyond the
legally-mandated minimum. One clear example is seen in a recent case
at Harvard University. As noted in a New York Times article, "[u]nder
Harvard's faculty policy, the university cannot make known its
evidence against [the accusedl, nor can he defend himself, until the
government's report is ready."'
Another example of an obvious discrepancy in the regulations relates
to possible recourse against bad faith allegations. As stated in the
Federal Register, finalizing current regulations:
The final rule, Sec. 93.300(d), requires institutions to take all
reasonable and practical steps to protect the positions and
reputations of good faith complainants and protect them from
retaliation by respondents and other institutional members. By
negative implication, such steps are not requiredfor badfaith
complainants. Bad faith complainants are those who, under the
definition of "good faith" in Sec. 93.210, do not have a belief in
the truth of their allegation that a reasonable person in the
complainant's position could have based on the information
known to the complainant at the time. We have determined there
is no need for the final rule to further address bad faith
allegations,given that institutions may have internalstandards of
14. Cf Nicholas Wade, Difficulties in Defining Errors in Case Against Harvard
Researcher, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/
science/26hauser.html.
15. Public Health Service Policies on Research Misconduct, 70 Fed. Reg. 28370, 2837778 (May 17, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 50, 93) (emphasis added).
16. See, e.g., Wade, supra note 14.
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conduct that address matters not addressed in the final rule (Sec.
93.319). "

In other words, federal regulations currently fail to provide any
protection for scientists against bad faith accusations, while at the same
time exacting serious consequences to any alleged "bad faith" by an
accused scientist. Because many institutions do not go beyond the
regulations' mandates, an accused scientist frequently has no remedy
against bad faith allegations.
Following current political trends, as well as reasoning behind
current federal regulations, most agencies and institutions bend over
backwards to provide rules that protect complainants and the institution
itself, but not accused scientists. Most institutions provide accused
scientists barebones protections at best, which often do not work at all.

III. EXISTING

PROTECTIONS FOR ACCUSED SCIENTISTS
ARE INSUFFICIENT

On its website, HHS states that research misconduct regulations aim
to provide "protection for respondents and complainants in research
misconduct cases. Institutions are required to protect the confidentiality
of the individuals involved, including the respondent."1 8
It is technically correct that some legal protections currently exist for
accused scientists, at least in theory. According to HHS federal
regulations and some agency/institutional rules, for example, an
institution must afford: (1) procedures that provide prompt response and
resolution of allegations; (2) confidentiality of the identity of parties
involved; and (3) fairness to ensure an impartial and unbiased
proceeding.19 With regard to the issue of fairness, regulations allow
respondents certain involvement in the evaluation process itself, such as
the ability to respond to draft inquiry and investigation reports, and the
ability to review some evidence. 0 Such protections are, at best, scant
protection needed for anyone accused. Furthermore, if an institution
fails to implement these minimal protections properly, it is unclear how
an accused researcher may remedy the situation.
For example, federal regulations mandate that institutions provide
17. Public Health Service Policies on Research Misconduct, 70 Fed. Reg. 28370, at
28379-80 (emphasis added).
18. Promoting Integrity in Research, supranote 2.
19. See 42 C.F.R. § 93.300 ("General responsibilities for compliance"); id. § 93.108
(2011) ("Confidentiality"); id. § 93.210 (2011) (defining "Good faith"); see also NAT'L INST. OF
HEALTH NIH INTRAMURAL RESEARCH PROGRAM POLICIES & PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATING

SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT (2001), http://sourcebook.od.nih.gov/ethic-conduct/smpolicy.htm.
20. Promoting Integrity in Research, supranote 2.
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prompt action and resolution of any allegation of research misconduct.21
Action and resolution may involve: an inquiry, an investigation, and an
institutional appeal, if available. 22 As noted by NIH, a "prompt response
to an allegation helps to minimize any harm to the public that could
result if misconduct is found and allows those who are incorrectly
accused to clear their names without going through a long process."
According to HHS regulations, the entire procedure at an institution for
addressing and making a finding regarding allegations of research
misconduct, including any institutional appeal, is intended to take less
than a year, and even less time if no appeal process is available. 24 As
stated in the regulations, final resolution within this time frame is a
necessary part of "[a] thorough, competent, objective, and fair response
to allegations of research misconduct."2 5
Published decisions of the HHS Departmental Appeals Board
(DAB), however, show that misconduct cases often take many years to
conclude at a given institution.26 For example, the Imanishi-Kari case
involved a scientist eventually exonerated by the DAB regardin
allegations of misconduct relating to work reported in a Cell paper.
The dispute began with concerns raised by scientists in May 1986.28
After initially concluding that no misconduct took place, NIH reopened
21.
22.

42 C.F.R. § 93.300(c).
See id. §§ 93.212, 93.307, 93.310.

23.

NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, A GUIDE TO THE HANDLING OF SCIENTIFIC MISCONDUCT

ALLEGATIONS

IN

THE

INTRAMURAL

RESEARCH

PROGRAM

AT

THE

NIH

(2001),

http://sourcebook.od.nih.gov/resethicscases/nih%20misconduct2.pdf (last visited Mar. 13,
2011).
24. An institution must complete an inquiry within 60 days of its initiation "unless
circumstances clearly warrant a longer period." 42 C.F.R. § 93.307(g) (2011). If an inquiry
determines that an investigation is warranted, the institution must begin its investigation within
30 days of that determination. 42 C.F.R. § 93.310(a) (2011). An institution also "must complete
all aspects of an investigation within 120 days of beginning it," including sending a final report
to ORI. 42 C.F.R. § 93.311 (2011). Assuming the institution's procedures provide for an appeal
by respondents (not required), the institution must complete that appeal within 120 days of its
filing. 42 C.F.R. § 93.314 (2011). Regarding these two 120-day time periods, an institution must
ask ORI for any extension in writing if unable to meet deadlines. §§ 93.311 and 93.314.
25. 42 C.F.R. § 93.304(b) (2011).
26. Popovic v. United States, 997 F. Supp. 672, 675 (D.Md. 1998) (allegations raised in
November 1989, formal investigation initiated by NIH in October 1990, revised report
forwarded to OSIR in March 1992, final report issued in December 1992); Angelides, DAB
Decision No. 1677, 1999 WL 88783 (H.H.S. Feb. 5, 1999), at *7 (allegations raised in
December 1992, final institutional investigation report issued in September 1994, an
institutional appeal occurred thereafter, resulting in ORI charges filed in Mar. 1997); Shanna,
DAB Decision No. 1431, 1993 WL 742551 (H.H.S. Aug. 6, 1993), at *5 (stating OSI/OSIR
issued a decision nearly two years after beginning its investigation).
27. Imanishi-Kari,DAB Decision No. 1582, 1996 WL 399931 (H.H.S. June 21, 1996), at
*2.
28. Id. at *5.
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an investigation in May 1989, which the ORI eventually conducted. In
October 1994, the ORI issued a report concluding that research
misconduct occurred.3 0 In November 1994, the accused scientist
requested a hearing with the DAB regarding ORI's charges. 3 ' The DAB
issued its decision finding no research misconduct on June 21, 1996.32
In other words, from start to finish, this case went on for a decade,
involving activity spanning years at any one institution or agency.
Likewise, in the more recent Harvard case, as noted by the New York
Times, "[t]he still unresolved case of Marc Hauser, the researcher
accused by Harvard of scientific misconduct, points to the painful
slowness of the government-university procedure for resolving such
charges." 33 In this case, "Harvard's investigation . . . has stuck so

closely to the letter of govemment-approved rules for investigating
misconduct that the process has become unduly protracted-it lasted
three years-and procedurally unfair to the accused." 34 Thus, while the
process is supposed to be short in theory, in reality, it is a painfully long
process in many instances, especially if it relates to high profile work.
Another basic protection for researchers, at least in theory, is that
institutions must keep the identity of respondents (accused) as well as
complainants (whistleblowers) confidential in research misconduct
proceedings. In this regard, 42 C.F.R. § 93.108(a) (2011) states that
"[d]isclosure of the identity of respondents and complainants in research
misconduct proceedings is limited, to the extent possible, to those who
need to know, consistent with a thorough, competent, objective and fair
research misconduct proceeding." 35 Questions leap to mind upon
reading this regulation, such as: what is "to the extent possible" and who
exactly "needs to know"? At minimum, the "need to know" group will
include every party to the assessment, inquiry and investigation at the
institution in question, including every witness questioned, those in
charge of handling allegations (including administrators), every person
on any inquiry and investigation committee, any scientific, IT and
forensic experts used, and legal personnel. In other words, the "need to
know" group will likely be large in any given case.
The unfortunate reality is that damaging gossip easily flies when so
many individuals have access to "tantalizing" information, with little to
no accountability. Considering this fact, how does an institution
effectively enforce confidentiality? How does an institution monitor,
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at *5-6.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Wade, supra note 14, at 1.
Id.
42 C.F.R. § 93.108(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
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control, or even hold accountable so many people directly, much less
those who may have heard information from them? Federal regulations
and the vast majority of institutional rules completely fail to address
these crucial questions, or even take a stab at providing viable answers.
In addition to prompt action and confidentiality, federal regulations
also require that institutions respond to allegations "in a thorough,
competent, objective and fair manner." 36 As part of this requirement,
regulations allow respondents to respond to draft inquiry and
investigation reports, and to review some evidence. 37 Notably, however,
institutions are not required to provide respondents access to any
evidence considered in an inquiry. 3 In other words, respondents have
no recourse if an inquiry committee selectively considers evidence in
the most damaging way. Moreover institutions need only provide access
to "evidence upon which the report is based" in an investigation. 39 Even
at the investigation stage, respondents only have access to evidence on
which an investigation report is based. Respondents have no right to
review any evidence not mentioned in the investigation report, even if
exculpatory evidence is missed, misinterpreted, or ignored during the
proceedings. 40
It is clear to anyone affected by allegations of research misconduct
that, at minimum, confidentiality, prompt action and resolution and
fairness in procedure are absolutely critical. As noted by NIH,
"[a]llegations of misconduct that prove to be untrue, even if they were
made in good faith, can damage careers and have a chilling effect on
research." 4
Assuming an institution fails to provide these minimal protections,
however, what exactly can one do about it? According to regulations
and many institutional rules, not much. HHS regulations do not
currently provide recourse if an institution fails to meet minimal
mandated standards of care. At most, a researcher may be able to appeal
to the institution itself to rectify the situation (assuming the institution
allows it and rectifying the situation is possible). In other words, at best,
researchers must rely on the very institution that failed to provide
protections in the first place. In fact, it appears that no formal appeal
process exists at many universities, NIH, and other federal institutions
or agencies.
As such, if an institution makes a questionable finding of research
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
28373.
41.

Id. § 93.300(b).
Id. § 93.304 (2011).
Id. § 93.308 (2011).
Id. § 93.312(a) (2011).
Public Health Service Policies on Research Misconduct, 70 Fed. Reg. 28370, at
NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, supranote 23, at 1.
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misconduct, for example, based on dubious evidence, bias of guilt or
personal grudge, or even a mistake, is there any recourse for affected
scientists? One must consider that federal regulations have set up
misconduct proceedings to be adversarial; that is, it is the accused
researcher versus the investigating institution and the people it chooses
to represent it. Especially after spending significant time and money to
"prove" its case, institutions often have a vested interest in making a
negative finding in order to justify bringing the case in the first instance,
and to show "zero tolerance" for misconduct in a global sense.
Moreover, an institution can easily make negative findings in light
of, for example: (1) the institution's low burden to prove research
misconduct, that is, a preponderance of the evidence; (2) the fact that
the definition of research misconduct includes conduct committed
"recklessly," not just "intentionally" or "knowingly"; and (3)
respondents have the burden to prove affirmative defenses, such as good
faith or difference of opinion. Thus, accused scientists sit in the
dangerous position of being investigated, evaluated, and judged by the
same entity, often involving many of the same people throughout the
process, where an institution can easily make a devastating finding.
Notably, HHS regulations do not require that an institution provide
any kind of appeal process, much less an objective one, after the
institution makes an adverse determination.4 2 At first blush, HHS
regulations appear somewhat misleading on this point because a
relatively sophisticated appeal process does exist regarding an ORI
adverse decision. Notably, however, the ORI differs from an institution
itself where the alleged misconduct takes place.
One might think a researcher can "appeal" a purely institutional
determination to the ORI, but this is not the case. As it turns out,
regardless of what the ORI ultimately decides to do (and even if it
determines that no research misconduct took place), once an institution
makes a finding of research misconduct on its own, that finding, and
any imposed sanctions, can stand on a permanent basis. Researchers
may have no avenue, via the ORI or any other agency, to initiate an
objective review of an institution's adverse decision, or to otherwise
"reverse" the decision or institutional sanctions. At best, researchers can
attempt to file a complaint with a court after "final agency action."4 3
Because U.S. agency laws impose significant limits on causes of action
and impose high burdens of proof on plaintiffs, however, such cases are
likely to be costly, difficult to bring and ultimately unsuccessful."
42. See 42 C.F.R. § 93.314 (2011) (stating that institutional appeals are "not required").
43. See id. § 93.500 (2011).
44. Judicial review of final agency actions is governed by the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2011). Under the APA, a reviewing court may set aside agency
actions, findings, or conclusions only if they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
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Moreover, many believe courts are 4enerally unsuited to resolve
research misconduct cases in any event.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Damage associated with allegations of research misconduct presents
itself in the form of: loss in reputation, loss in time and resources for
research, personal stress, reduction in quality of life, and over-scrutiny
of research and manuscripts. Further damage may also include a
reduction in publication rates, research grant awards, professional
advancement, academic tenure, promotions, admission to scientific or
honor societies, and social status. This type of damage often happens
after a misconduct proceeding begins, but well before any official
finding occurs. Moreover, the damage can be permanent regardless of
ultimate outcome. Even assuming an institution makes "all reasonable
and practical efforts" to restore the reputation of an accused scientist
after the institution has made no finding of research misconduct,4 6 such
efforts are likely be too little too late.
HHS can modify existing federal regulations to provide adequate
protections for accused researchers. Ten proposals for reform, presented
below, provide guidance.
Proposal 1: Enact regulations mandating that an institution provide
respondents copies of, or supervised access to, all evidence considered
during an inquiry or investigation.
Rationale: Respondents should have access to all available
evidence in order to adequately avail themselves to exculpatory
evidence that might otherwise be missed or ignored.
Proposal 2: Enact regulations requiring that an inquiry consider and
address in a report all raised affirmative defenses, such as evidence of
good faith, differences of opinion and/or honest error before making a
determination to go forward with an investigation.
otherwise not in accordance with the law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2011). This constitutes a high
threshold to meet, and a party challenging an agency's action as arbitrary and capricious bears
the burden of proof. City of Olmsted Falls v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 292 F.3d 261, 271 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
45. See, e.g., Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1047 (N.D. Ill.
1998) (noting that "the legal process is not suited to resolving scientific disputes or identifying
scientific misconduct") (quoting United States ex rel. Milam v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 912 F.
Supp. 868, 886 (D. Md. 1995)); see also Dan L. Burk, Research Misconduct: Deviance, Due
Process, and the Disestablishment of Science, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REv. 305, 333-34
(1995).
46. See 42 C.F.R. § 93.304(k) (2011).
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Rationale: To the extent that allegations and evidence are
insufficient and/or evidence establishes good faith, difference of opinion
or honest error, the process should stop at an inquiry. Proper
consideration at an inquiry will reduce the time researchers and
institutions are subjected to costs associated with allegations and
misconduct proceedings.
Proposal 3: Enact regulations that clearly define "recklessly" in the
definition of research misconduct. 4 7 The definition should require an
intent to deceive or a conscious reckless disregard for the truth. Mere
negligence should not meet this standard, however egregious.
Rationale: Because regulations and published decisions do not
clearly characterize "recklessly" in the definition of research
misconduct, this prong could be used to make inappropriate findings of
research misconduct. Equating wrong or sloppy science with research
misconduct will "chill" scientists, research, as well as public
dissemination of science. Avenues already exist to identify and correct
erroneous science.
Proposal 4: Enact regulations mandating that "significant
departure" and "accepted practices" in the definition of research
misconduct be defined by objective outside experts in the field, and in
light of published evidence, rather than based on opinion of individuals
directly involved in the misconduct proceeding.4 8
Rationale: Regulations and published decisions do not clearly
characterize "significant departure from accepted practices" in the
definition of research misconduct. Absent an objective means for
defining "significant departure" and "accepted practices," an institution
could inadvertently make an adverse finding based what amounts to a
difference of opinion, which is not research misconduct.4 9 Reasonable
minds often differ on what "significant departure" means, and this can
go to the heart of a research misconduct case.
Proposal 5: Enact regulations mandating that violations of
confidentiality regarding identity of respondents constitute research
misconduct, subject to allegation, inquiry, investigation, and sanctions.
Rationale: Confidentiality is a critical protection for accused
researchers, and one that is often violated without accountability or
47. Id. § 93.104(b) (2011) (requiring that a finding of research misconduct requires that
the "misconduct be committed intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly").
48. See id. § 93.104(a) (stating that a finding of research misconduct requires that there
"be a significant departure from accepted practices of the relevant research community").
49. See id. § 93.103(d) (2011) (stating that "[r]esearch misconduct does not include
honest error or differences of opinion").
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recourse.
Proposal 6: Enact regulations outlining that lodging a bad faith
allegation constitutes research misconduct, and/or otherwise triggers an
objective review, finding and consequences.
Rationale: Regulations provide no recourse against abuse by bad
faith actors intent on damaging others out of malice or for personal gain.
Proposal 7: Enact regulations requiring that an institution/agency
prove research misconduct by clear and convincing evidence (CCE),
especially before imposing any sanctions or publicizing a negative
finding. The CCE burden is higher than preponderance of the evidence
(POE), but less than "beyond a reasonable doubt."
Rationale: A determination of research misconduct can demoralize
scientists, reduce funding, publication and promotion, and even destroy
careers. The cost is often more devastating than a financial or business
loss in a court proceeding. One presumes researchers are good actors
until proven otherwise.
Proposal 8: Revise regulations to reflect that respondents/accused
receive the same "positions and reputation" protections as complainants
until, and unless, the institution makes a final determination of research
misconduct, and after appeals have been exhausted.
Rationale: Respondents are often damaged by an allegation before a
formal finding is made. For example, confidentiality is easily breached,
but it is often difficult to identify a breaching party.
Proposal 9: Enact regulations requiring that ORI (or other objective
outside agency) enforce the mandated timelines, with consequences to
the institution or agency if timelines are not met, e.g., outside agency
will take over and/or stop proceedings permanently.
Rationale: Regulations currently provide timelines. Damage and
losses resulting from allegations and misconduct proceedings often
occur well before any formal proceeding concludes. Delay in
concluding matters inappropriately exacerbates such losses.
Proposal 10: Enact regulations mandating that ORI (or other
objective outside agency) has authority to reverse or alter findings and
sanctions by an institution or agency.
Rationale: Researchers accused of misconduct are investigated,
evaluated and judged by an institution that can easily make a
devastating finding. Regulations provide no accountability or recourse
against factually or legally wrong conclusions or overzealous sanctions.
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Creating and enforcing equitable protections for those who are
accused of research misconduct will provide much needed fairness to
the process of evaluating such allegations. Moreover, additional
protections may actually motivate good faith researchers to come
forward with information regarding misconduct. While providing
whistleblower protection is important, it has proven ineffective by itself.
In a political environment advocating for "zero tolerance" for those who
commit research misconduct, as well as those who fail to report
suspected misconduct, protections against overzealousness and abuse
are prudent. Doing so will help promote the very ideals of research
integrity that scientific communities wish to accomplish.

